of the name was not "a purely fortuitous thing," but was informed and deliberate. Id. at 456. He had actual knowledge of the Miami restaurants before choosing the name and had disregarded a desist notice. Prior to this civil action the plaintiffs were denied relief under N.Y. PEN. LAW § 964. a 291 F.2d at 3o3. The trial court's failure to make an express finding of "secondary meaning" and the "likelihood of confusion" was not reversible error, because the appellate court could infer from the evidence, including statistics on the seasonal migration between Brooklyn and Miami, gross business, and gratuitous remarks about the Miami restaurants on nation-wide television, that these restaurants had acquired "secondary meaning." See also Premier-Pabst Corp. v. The Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 760 (D. Conn. 1935) (Hincks, J.) . But see John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 F.2d 314, 317 ( 7 th Cir. xg6i) (trial court's failure to find "secondary meaning" must be construed as finding it does not exist). "The reasons for choosing the name, such as the fact that the secretary of the corporation was known as a "wolf" in his younger days, and the reasons for using "Wolfies Floridan Style French Toast" as a menu item, and reproducing in substantial form the arrangement of the plaintiff's menu were found to be "specious." Suspicion was increased by the use of a disclaimer, printed in red 3A6" high letters inside the menu. 185 F. Supp. at 457. Since the trial court found all this specifically, Judge Hincks saw no distinction between this conduct and ordinary "palming off" in a products case. 292 F.2d at 303.
Palming off involves both deceit of the public and the misappropriation of the name, reputation or business good will of another, Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct.), af 'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 878, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996-(1956) , evidence demanded of the plaintiffs-and to the granting of a "name monopoly"' to a "not too unique nickname" primarily on the basis of its "flagrant appropriation.' rt The purpose of trade name protection, especially in non-competitive situations, is to prevent injury to the reputation of an established concern. 8 Such an injury can arise when a presumably inferior concern," and is usually associated with a competitive relationship, involving actual trade diversion. Ball v. United Artists Corp., 13 App. Div. ad 133, 2x4-N.Y.S.2d z29, 2z5 (196i); 3 RESTATEMENT, To TS § 7xo (1938) . But where a person holds out his business as a branch of or as sponsored by another with a better reputation, there is "palming off" in a broad sense. Stork Restaurant Inc. v. Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 9o, 94 (E.D. Pa. i94i).
5 "A trade name implies trade. If trade is not affected, there is no loss, no chance of deflection ... there is no proof or even claim that plaintiffs' name, credit, reputation for quality, or kindred assets are being tarnished by the defendant. 'The dissent distinguished those cases involving better-known concerns from the present one: "It may well be that a 'Stork Club' or a 'Pump Room' should qualify for exclusionary protection as against an ordinary citizen named 'Joe' but quare whether a restaurant operator using a soubriquet in its familiar or diminutive form 'Wolfie' can in this day and age claim such uniqueness. which may be many miles away or producing entirely different goods, imitates the name of a well-known concern and tarnishes its repututation by creating an unfavorable association between the two concerns.3 But before protection is granted, before another's use of a similar 1 ' or identical 1 2 trade name is denied or restricted, the established concern usually must show that its name has acquired a special, source-identifying quality in its business use. 3 Once this quality is established, 4 so is the Co. v Protection extends as far as the name is understood in its "secondary" sense and to any locality where it can be shown to be injuring the plaintiff. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (i916). Therefore, a larger area of protection will be granted where the traveling public has carried the plaintiff's reputation to far-distant points and where his business attracts customers from a large area. Quality Courts United, Inc. v. Quality Courts, Inc., 14o F. Supp. 341, 349 (M.D. Pa. 1956 ).
Under such conditions, the real, immediate beneficiaries of an injunction are usually the establishments competing with the defendant, who have lost custom by improper use of a trade-attracting name. Developments in the Law, supra note 9, at 892 n.565 (955).
Oates has speculated that the "vitally interested, actual competitors of the defendant may be the complainants of the future, and, without resort to the Federal Trade Commission, they may acquire in their own right relief against traders who compete with them by the unfair use of a third party's name. " The plaintiff has the burden of proving that his name has acquired special significance in the trade and that the defendant is using it unfairly to his and the public's detriment. CALLMANN likelihood of confusion, the primary legal issue and the supposed cause of the injury." The trade name will then be endowed by the courts with a qualified "property" interest 6 and given the same sort of protection as a common law, distinctive trademark.
7
Although this "property" concept has expanded, covering larger areas of business interests," 8 the likelihood of injury to the plaintiffs' business reputation would seem analytically dependent on a finding of "secondary meaning."" 9 The Wolfies decision, however, protected the L. REV. z54 (196o). But no presumption of "secondary meaning" can be made where the name or device is neither fanciful nor used so long, extensively and exclusively so that association with the user would naturally result. z NIMS 1o39, 1078. 
406, 416-x8 (1961).
1" If "secondary meaning" is lacking, it is illogical to say that the Brooklyn College students across the street were motivated by a belief that the defendant's restaurant was associated with the plaintiffs'. Familiarity with a convenient restaurant, its commendation by others, or its own quality of food, and not the name "Wolfes," Secondary meaning has been held to be necessary to acquire "a distinctive quality," a prerequisite to protection, although relief will be granted "notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services. plaintiffs' trade name without requiring a finding of "secondary meaning." The court was more concerned with the nature of the defendant's unjustified conduct than with analytical symmetry."
The court's sensitive concern and condemning reaction to the defendant's conduct was nevertheless compatible with the "equitable" nature of trade name cases. 21 The typical fact situation in these cases may support a variety of inferences and resulting rationales, giving judges and litigants much semantic flexibility. 22 Furthermore, each case must be evaluated on its individual merits. 3 If evidence of "secondary meaning" is weak, its presence uncertain, a litigant can still turn to other elements in his effort to either swing or strengthen the equitable balance in his favor.
One of these "equitable" elements is the seemingly unjustified conduct of the imitator. 24 1957) , in which a competing animal farm owner in the same region as the plaintiff was enjoined from imitating special designs, cut-outs, and advertising developed around "Santa Claus," a legendary and historical figure to which the plaintiff had no exclusive right. Although relying mainly on the "misappropriation doctrine" of International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) , the court also found a "misrepresentation," a "passing off" of a business as that of another. It has been argued, however, that this case could have been decided according to a rapid acquisition of "secondary meaning." Speedry Products, Inc. v. Dri Mark Products, Inc., 271 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir. 1959). But in any event the Santa case involved such an obvious theft of a business idea that the fraudulent nature of the defendant's conduct was apparent. Ibid.
type of competitive business injury, lacking in Wolfies, had been present; 3 3 insistence on "secondary meaning" would have denied or at least delayed protection from definite harm.
34
When "secondary meaning" is required, however, it affords most competing enterprises indulging in "product differentiation" through non-functional designs, 5 selling seasonal items, 3 " or operating with limited advertising budgets, 7 little protection from a quick-acting imitator. 3 The traditional position, represented by the dissent in "' This is true because of the traditional proof requirements of long and exclusive use of a personal name, descriptive word or non-functional design before "secondary meaning" is usually established. See notes 14 supra, 42 infra. 37Although "big" concerns have no certainty that advertising will imprint their trade name in the public's mind so that "secondary meaning" is rapidly acquired, the "smalP business often is unable to finance such an effort. It must rely on the good faith of its competitors if it takes a chance and chooses a personal name, descriptive word, or non-functional design to distinguish its products. For this reason a relaxadon of the "secondary meaning" requirement may be desirable. Compare Catalina, Inc. v. Ganis, 207 Misc. io68, 142 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (relief given, recognizing limited promotion but likelihood of injury).
Compare note 54 infra, discussing the suggested fact-finding improvements that can be made in unfair competition cases. While such improvements enhance objectivity, they nevertheless impose greater expenses on one who asserts his rights to exclusive use of a trade name.
See TRADE NAME PROTECTION Wolfes, 89 is to deny relief to the prior user of a non-functional design 4 0 or color, 41 as well as personal names, unless a source-identifying quality has been acquired at the time of the imitation 4 2 This effort takes time and expense with no certainty of success.
To remedy this uncertainty and facilitate protection, some commentators have suggested modifications of the "secondary meaning" requirement.
43
The absence of "commercial necessity" for using an intruding trade symbol 4 or the recognition of an "about-to-be-acquired secondary meaning" 45 have been proposed as ways to protect a prior user of a trade name without an express finding of "secondary meaning." "0 See Galbally, supra note 38, who says the law has failed to keep up with marketing developments by failing to protect the "personality" of a goods' fanciful features against the commercial free-rider. Garner also urges the courts to recognize the real function of trade names as one of "display." Then all the evidence problems in "secondary meaning" litigation would be solved. Once a term is displayed in a trademark way, it can be presumed to have public acceptance at once. The primary meaning would exist side by side with the trade meaning; the former need not be submerged by long and intensive use before the latter can exist. "o This would be consistent with an older, now minority rule that made imitation illegal if merely the similarity of the designs was likely to deceive consumers. See generally 3 CALLMANN § 77.4(e) (2), at 1259-6o; Galbally, supra note 38.
meaning" is definitely established.
47
The controlling considerations would then seem to be the cost of changing a trade name or symbol relative to any potential loss to the plaintiff's business interests 48 and the breadth of the judicial imagination seeking feasible alternatives.
The "economic realities" and apparent simplicity of such standards seem attractive, but they must be balanced against their effect on the procedural and proof requirements in trade name cases. Under the "commercial necessity" test, for example, a mere showing of imitation in an area frequented by some of the prior user's customers would seem to establish a prima fade case or a presumption of unjustified imitation for trade purposes. 49 The second user would then have the burden of convincing the trier of facts that he had no unlawful intent, 0 or that no other name was reasonably as suitable as the one he now uses. Under the "about-to-be-acquired secondary meaning" standard, a presumption of injury to a business reputation through an erroneous association between two concerns would be established without proof that it has or ever will acquire that source-identifying interest that is supposedly in danger and entitled to legal protection. 
1954).
"This would assume, however, that good faith and ignorance of prior use would still be valid defenses. Under existing procedure the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff, although defendant's counsel would try to rebut any inference of unlawful intent which ihe plaintiff's evidence tended to show. Under the alternative approach a burden of dissuasion would seem to control and be placed on the defendant.
" Unless the plaintiff can show that his business interest comes within an expanding category of protectable interests, supra note 8, the only other interest recognized under the common law is that of source identity and the reputation attached to it. A court may also hesitate to either indulge in speculation or place itself in an analytical dilemma. See note 1 5 supra.
be given to these implications before the "secondary meaning" requirement is either relaxed or discarded.
52
Those who favor relaxation of the "secondary meaning" requirement apparently view the judicial function as one of establishing rules of fair business conduct and discouraging unjustified imitation in order to prevent any form of unjust enrichment." In fulfilling this function, however, the court would act as a regulator of the market place, guided by its own notions of commercial fair play and necessity. The "secondary meaning" requirement, on the other hand, does give some definite, predictable "due process" guidance to judges and litigants. 54 They know in advance how the conflicting claims to the use of a trade name will be settled. 55 A relaxation of the "secondary meaning" requirement in order to reach an acceptable result and advocate higher standards of business conduct may fail to respect the analytical and procedural foundations that support the protection of trade names, especially under non-competitive conditions. The legal risks in choosing a business name "' See authorities cited note 21 supra. But see Galbally, supra note 38, at 342, stating that "when courts abandon known rules in favor of vague and subjective standards of ethics and morality, the practice of law becomes hazardous. Judges become as unpredictable as juries. Business decisions, however, must be predicated on the reasonable predictability of legal consequences."
"' Adherence to a generally accepted manner of procedure is desirable to limit the area of uncertainty. Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Cheseborough-Pond's, Inc., 281 F.2d 755, 762 (2d Cir. x96o) (dissenting opinion). Therefore, instead of relaxing or replacing the "secondary meaning" test, its weaknesses could be cured by adopting more objective methods of measurement. " Without a standard other than subjective evaluation, "confusion and uncertainty will inevitably beset businesses everywhere." It is this problem, not the preservation of the "mQsaic of the law," that gives pause to advocates of conceptual reform. Galbally, supra note 38, at 342.
